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Table 4 Estimates of differences in allowance rates by gubernatorial term length before 2000

From: The political economy of the disability insurance: theory and evidence of gubernatorial learning

 

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

(11)

(12)

Dependent variable

Disability Insurance (DI)

Concurrent (DI + SSI)

Disability Insurance (DI)

Concurrent (DI + SSI)

 

allowance rate (in %)

allowance rate (in %)

log-applications (in %)

log-applications (in %)

Mean

43.90

30.08

892.8

870.8

=1 if multi-term governor

1.31**

1.35**

0.91**

1.67***

1.61**

1.24***

-2.36*

-0.56

0.48

-2.21

-1.15

-1.48

 

(0.51)

(0.62)

(0.43)

(0.57)

(0.65)

(0.45)

(1.38)

(1.33)

(1.59)

(1.70)

(1.65)

(2.40)

=1 if governor cannot

-1.28**

-1.01

-0.83*

-1.88***

-1.67***

-0.86*

3.46**

1.79

0.07

3.88**

3.16*

0.20

run again

            
 

(0.63)

(0.63)

(0.47)

(0.63)

(0.61)

(0.45)

(1.66)

(1.49)

(1.88)

(1.87)

(1.68)

(2.62)

=1 if the previous governor

 

0.84

0.48

 

0.21

0.62

 

-0.02

2.18

 

-0.26

-3.43

is from the same party

            
  

(0.54)

(0.43)

 

(0.53)

(0.44)

 

(1.22)

(1.84)

 

(1.67)

(2.44)

Election year

 

0.15

0.06

 

-0.12

0.48**

 

-0.86

-1.06*

 

0.05

0.88

  

(0.31)

(0.18)

 

(0.31)

(0.19)

 

(0.71)

(0.59)

 

(0.84)

(0.80)

Employed/Population

 

32.56**

21.04**

 

-1.19

3.64

 

-261.26***

-278.19***

 

-226.33***

-349.03***

  

(16.09)

(8.35)

 

(17.59)

(7.81)

 

(31.42)

(33.76)

 

(44.35)

(50.08)

Mean personal income

 

-0.05

-0.15**

 

-0.01

-0.25***

 

0.26

1.31***

 

-0.44

-0.01

  

(0.19)

(0.07)

 

(0.17)

(0.07)

 

(0.51)

(0.31)

 

(0.54)

(0.43)

% of pop below 100% of poverty level

 

0.72

-7.85

 

-7.38

-19.16***

 

15.95

28.17

 

1.12

25.41

  

(11.83)

(6.43)

 

(10.40)

(6.35)

 

(22.26)

(24.36)

 

(27.85)

(31.37)

% of working age pop (18 ≤age≤64)

 

-25.99

33.05**

 

2.74

60.77***

 

-32.93

237.86***

 

47.30

120.31*

  

(23.00)

(13.12)

 

(21.90)

(13.31)

 

(45.63)

(46.76)

 

(51.65)

(64.38)

Married

 

-8.48

-31.88***

 

-27.65

-42.76***

 

104.62***

-19.24

 

-28.11

17.71

  

(19.29)

(11.75)

 

(18.75)

(12.07)

 

(39.94)

(44.30)

 

(48.96)

(58.78)

White

 

1.14

10.35***

 

6.42

3.32

 

-23.60

-239.73***

 

-4.40

-273.05***

  

(10.22)

(3.23)

 

(9.86)

(2.55)

 

(23.83)

(16.92)

 

(25.81)

(24.31)

Age-adjusted-rate

 

-0.00

-0.04***

 

0.01

-0.02***

 

0.01

0.10***

 

0.09**

0.00

  

(0.01)

(0.00)

 

(0.01)

(0.00)

 

(0.02)

(0.02)

 

(0.04)

(0.03)

DI replacement rate

 

-2.38

0.77

 

10.71

-2.05

 

-110.02***

-72.10***

 

-203.69***

-267.26***

  

(12.63)

(5.90)

 

(12.25)

(6.24)

 

(31.39)

(25.18)

 

(43.19)

(33.56)

UI replacement rate

 

1.40

-7.66

 

10.87

5.48

 

28.12

-0.92

 

39.02

-37.99

  

(6.26)

(5.24)

 

(7.99)

(5.36)

 

(18.51)

(23.17)

 

(28.70)

(30.26)

State FE

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Year FE

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Clustered standard errors

Y

Y

N

Y

Y

N

Y

Y

N

Y

Y

N

Estimation method

OLS

OLS

GLS

OLS

OLS

GLS

OLS

OLS

GLS

OLS

OLS

GLS

Observations

749

708

708

749

708

708

749

708

708

749

708

708

R-squared

0.791

0.795

–

0.729

0.730

–

0.993

0.994

 

0.991

0.992

–

  1. Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (4 lags) robust standard errors at the state level in parentheses. Coefficients that are significant at the.10 [.05] (.01) are marked with *[**](***). Regressions all include additional controls for state marriage rates and age-adjusted state death rates.