From: The political economy of the disability insurance: theory and evidence of gubernatorial learning
 | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Dependent variable | Disability Insurance (DI) | Concurrent (DI + SSI) | Disability Insurance (DI) | Concurrent (DI + SSI) | ||||||||
 | allowance rate (in %) | allowance rate (in %) | log-applications (in %) | log-applications (in %) | ||||||||
Mean | 43.90 | 30.08 | 892.8 | 870.8 | ||||||||
=1 if multi-term governor | 1.31** | 1.35** | 0.91** | 1.67*** | 1.61** | 1.24*** | -2.36* | -0.56 | 0.48 | -2.21 | -1.15 | -1.48 |
 | (0.51) | (0.62) | (0.43) | (0.57) | (0.65) | (0.45) | (1.38) | (1.33) | (1.59) | (1.70) | (1.65) | (2.40) |
=1 if governor cannot | -1.28** | -1.01 | -0.83* | -1.88*** | -1.67*** | -0.86* | 3.46** | 1.79 | 0.07 | 3.88** | 3.16* | 0.20 |
run again | Â | Â | Â | Â | Â | Â | Â | Â | Â | Â | Â | Â |
 | (0.63) | (0.63) | (0.47) | (0.63) | (0.61) | (0.45) | (1.66) | (1.49) | (1.88) | (1.87) | (1.68) | (2.62) |
=1 if the previous governor | Â | 0.84 | 0.48 | Â | 0.21 | 0.62 | Â | -0.02 | 2.18 | Â | -0.26 | -3.43 |
is from the same party | Â | Â | Â | Â | Â | Â | Â | Â | Â | Â | Â | Â |
 |  | (0.54) | (0.43) |  | (0.53) | (0.44) |  | (1.22) | (1.84) |  | (1.67) | (2.44) |
Election year | Â | 0.15 | 0.06 | Â | -0.12 | 0.48** | Â | -0.86 | -1.06* | Â | 0.05 | 0.88 |
 |  | (0.31) | (0.18) |  | (0.31) | (0.19) |  | (0.71) | (0.59) |  | (0.84) | (0.80) |
Employed/Population | Â | 32.56** | 21.04** | Â | -1.19 | 3.64 | Â | -261.26*** | -278.19*** | Â | -226.33*** | -349.03*** |
 |  | (16.09) | (8.35) |  | (17.59) | (7.81) |  | (31.42) | (33.76) |  | (44.35) | (50.08) |
Mean personal income | Â | -0.05 | -0.15** | Â | -0.01 | -0.25*** | Â | 0.26 | 1.31*** | Â | -0.44 | -0.01 |
 |  | (0.19) | (0.07) |  | (0.17) | (0.07) |  | (0.51) | (0.31) |  | (0.54) | (0.43) |
% of pop below 100% of poverty level | Â | 0.72 | -7.85 | Â | -7.38 | -19.16*** | Â | 15.95 | 28.17 | Â | 1.12 | 25.41 |
 |  | (11.83) | (6.43) |  | (10.40) | (6.35) |  | (22.26) | (24.36) |  | (27.85) | (31.37) |
% of working age pop (18 ≤age≤64) |  | -25.99 | 33.05** |  | 2.74 | 60.77*** |  | -32.93 | 237.86*** |  | 47.30 | 120.31* |
 |  | (23.00) | (13.12) |  | (21.90) | (13.31) |  | (45.63) | (46.76) |  | (51.65) | (64.38) |
Married | Â | -8.48 | -31.88*** | Â | -27.65 | -42.76*** | Â | 104.62*** | -19.24 | Â | -28.11 | 17.71 |
 |  | (19.29) | (11.75) |  | (18.75) | (12.07) |  | (39.94) | (44.30) |  | (48.96) | (58.78) |
White | Â | 1.14 | 10.35*** | Â | 6.42 | 3.32 | Â | -23.60 | -239.73*** | Â | -4.40 | -273.05*** |
 |  | (10.22) | (3.23) |  | (9.86) | (2.55) |  | (23.83) | (16.92) |  | (25.81) | (24.31) |
Age-adjusted-rate | Â | -0.00 | -0.04*** | Â | 0.01 | -0.02*** | Â | 0.01 | 0.10*** | Â | 0.09** | 0.00 |
 |  | (0.01) | (0.00) |  | (0.01) | (0.00) |  | (0.02) | (0.02) |  | (0.04) | (0.03) |
DI replacement rate | Â | -2.38 | 0.77 | Â | 10.71 | -2.05 | Â | -110.02*** | -72.10*** | Â | -203.69*** | -267.26*** |
 |  | (12.63) | (5.90) |  | (12.25) | (6.24) |  | (31.39) | (25.18) |  | (43.19) | (33.56) |
UI replacement rate | Â | 1.40 | -7.66 | Â | 10.87 | 5.48 | Â | 28.12 | -0.92 | Â | 39.02 | -37.99 |
 |  | (6.26) | (5.24) |  | (7.99) | (5.36) |  | (18.51) | (23.17) |  | (28.70) | (30.26) |
State FE | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
Year FE | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
Clustered standard errors | Y | Y | N | Y | Y | N | Y | Y | N | Y | Y | N |
Estimation method | OLS | OLS | GLS | OLS | OLS | GLS | OLS | OLS | GLS | OLS | OLS | GLS |
Observations | 749 | 708 | 708 | 749 | 708 | 708 | 749 | 708 | 708 | 749 | 708 | 708 |
R-squared | 0.791 | 0.795 | – | 0.729 | 0.730 | – | 0.993 | 0.994 |  | 0.991 | 0.992 | – |