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Table 5 Estimates of gubernatorial learning separate from electoral effects before 2000

From: The political economy of the disability insurance: theory and evidence of gubernatorial learning

  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable Disability Insurance (DI) Concurrent (DI + SSI)
  allowance rate (in %) allowance rate (in %)
Mean 44.02 30.15
=1 if multi-term governor 1.35** 1.47*   1.61** 1.60*  
  (0.62) (0.80)   (0.65) (0.84)  
=1 if governor will serve    -0.56    -1.19
more than one term       
    (0.67)    (0.75)
=1 if previous governor is 0.84 1.68** 1.40** 0.21 0.36 0.85
from the same party       
  (0.56) (0.81) (0.64) (0.53) (0.79) (0.61)
=1 if governor cannot -1.01 -1.52** -2.19** -1.67*** -1.75** -2.51***
run again       
  (0.63) (0.76) (1.00) (0.62) (0.80) (0.86)
Election year 0.15 0.15 -0.05 -0.12 -0.05 -0.14
  (0.34) (0.38) (0.40) (0.35) (0.38) (0.43)
State FE Y N Y Y N Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Governor FE N Y N N Y N
Observations 745 745 457 745 745 457
R-squared 0.795 0.878 0.842 0.730 0.842 0.775
  1. With governor fixed effect the standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the governor level, with state fixed effects the standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (4 lags). Coefficients that are significant at the.10 [.05] (.01) are marked with *[**](***). Regressions all include additional controls for year fixed effects, state marriage rates and age-adjusted state death rates.