From: The political economy of the disability insurance: theory and evidence of gubernatorial learning
 | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Dependent variable | Disability Insurance (DI) | Concurrent (DI + SSI) | ||||
 | allowance rate (in %) | allowance rate (in %) | ||||
Mean | 44.02 | 30.15 | ||||
=1 if multi-term governor | 1.35** | 1.47* | Â | 1.61** | 1.60* | Â |
 | (0.62) | (0.80) |  | (0.65) | (0.84) |  |
=1 if governor will serve | Â | Â | -0.56 | Â | Â | -1.19 |
more than one term | Â | Â | Â | Â | Â | Â |
 |  |  | (0.67) |  |  | (0.75) |
=1 if previous governor is | 0.84 | 1.68** | 1.40** | 0.21 | 0.36 | 0.85 |
from the same party | Â | Â | Â | Â | Â | Â |
 | (0.56) | (0.81) | (0.64) | (0.53) | (0.79) | (0.61) |
=1 if governor cannot | -1.01 | -1.52** | -2.19** | -1.67*** | -1.75** | -2.51*** |
run again | Â | Â | Â | Â | Â | Â |
 | (0.63) | (0.76) | (1.00) | (0.62) | (0.80) | (0.86) |
Election year | 0.15 | 0.15 | -0.05 | -0.12 | -0.05 | -0.14 |
 | (0.34) | (0.38) | (0.40) | (0.35) | (0.38) | (0.43) |
State FE | Y | N | Y | Y | N | Y |
Year FE | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
Governor FE | N | Y | N | N | Y | N |
Observations | 745 | 745 | 457 | 745 | 745 | 457 |
R-squared | 0.795 | 0.878 | 0.842 | 0.730 | 0.842 | 0.775 |