From: The political economy of the disability insurance: theory and evidence of gubernatorial learning
 | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
 | Sample restricted to states in years in which they have |  |  |  |  | |||
 | Full sample | Unemployment | % of expenditures | Split government | Restrictions | Super-majority | Republican | Governor with |
 |  | rate above | which are deficit | (governor and | on tax and | requirements for | governor | line-item veto |
 |  | national median | spending above | legislative | expenditure | new tax or |  | (Can reject |
 |  | unemployment | average % of | majority of | increases | expenditure laws |  | single items |
 |  |  | deficit spending | opposite parties) |  |  |  | in legislation) |
Panel A: dependent variable is Disability Insurance (DI) only allowance rate | ||||||||
=1 if multi-term governor | 1.35** | 2.44*** | 1.10* | 1.35 | 1.92** | 3.20*** | 2.52*** | -0.14 |
 | (0.62) | (0.87) | (0.61) | (0.87) | (0.81) | (1.10) | (0.93) | (1.01) |
=1 if the previous governor is from the same party | 0.84 | 2.62*** | 0.33 | 0.74 | 1.74** | 0.90 | 1.12 | 0.99 |
 | (0.56) | (1.00) | (0.73) | (0.81) | (0.74) | (1.23) | (0.88) | (0.97) |
=1 if governor cannot run again | -1.01 | -2.88*** | -1.15 | -2.59*** | -1.24 | -4.38*** | -2.76*** | -0.75 |
 | (0.63) | (0.90) | (0.73) | (0.85) | (0.92) | (1.01) | (1.05) | (1.02) |
Panel B: dependent variable is concurrent (DI + SSI) allowance rate | ||||||||
=1 if multi-term governor | 1.61** | 1.71** | 1.48* | 1.80* | 2.10** | 3.34*** | 2.32*** | 0.02 |
 | (0.65) | (0.85) | (0.78) | (0.92) | (0.93) | (1.08) | (0.85) | (1.20) |
=1 if the previous governor is from the same party | 0.21 | 1.38 | 0.12 | 0.54 | 1.03 | 0.44 | 0.63 | 0.57 |
 | (0.53) | (0.86) | (0.73) | (0.83) | (0.72) | (1.03) | (0.81) | (1.09) |
=1 if governor cannot run again | -1.67*** | -2.21** | -1.76** | -3.02*** | -1.79* | -3.51*** | -2.70*** | -0.79 |
 | (0.62) | (0.92) | (0.81) | (0.86) | (0.97) | (0.94) | (0.98) | (1.19) |
Observations | 745 | 265 | 329 | 371 | 317 | 144 | 368 | 287 |