Skip to main content

Table 7 Determinants of reform stance, selected domains, with controls for initial policy levels

From: A decade of labour market reforms in the EU: insights from the LABREF database

 

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Dependent variable: reform stance by domain

Labour Taxation

Unempl. Benefits

EPL

EPL (temp. contracts)

Per-capita GDP in 2000

−0.036

−0.004

−0.005

−0.005

 

(0.022)

(0.011)

(0.014)

(0.009)

New Member State (dummy)

−0.538

−0.359

0.194

−0.169

 

(0.495)

(0.292)

(0.368)

(0.190)

Unemployment rate (1st lag)

−0.105**

0.019

−0.030

0.011

 

(0.043)

(0.021)

(0.035)

(0.022)

Output gap < −4 (dummy)

1.203

−0.420

0.104

0.109

(0.738)

(0.324)

(0.385)

(0.230)

Parliamentary election year (dummy)

0.022

0.105

0.047

0.001

 

(0.249)

(0.154)

(0.159)

(0.113)

1 year after parl. elections (dummy)

0.126

−0.334

−0.253

−0.040

 

(0.266)

(0.221)

(0.211)

(0.121)

Fraction of seats held by the government in Parliament

−0.878

−0.764

1.375

0.617

(1.199)

(1.089)

(0.886)

(0.515)

Fixed exchange rate (dummy)

−0.129

0.237

−0.082

−0.103

 

(0.223)

(0.179)

(0.210)

(0.096)

Real interest rate spread (1st lag)

0.011

−0.012

−0.096**

−0.083***

 

(0.046)

(0.032)

(0.038)

(0.026)

Net lending of general government (1st lag)

−0.091**

0.043**

0.012

−0.004

 

(0.041)

(0.019)

(0.020)

(0.013)

Tax wedge (1st lag)

−0.032**

   
 

(0.014)

   

Net replacement rate of unemployment benefits, (1st lag)

 

−0.014***

  
 

(0.005)

  

Employment protection index, regular contracts (1st lag)

  

−0.194*

 
  

(0.113)

 

Employment protection index, temporary contracts (1st lag)

  

0.030

−0.015

  

(0.088)

(0.052)

Observations

241

229

222

222

R-squared

0.229

0.113

0.179

0.110

  1. Notes: (1) OLS regressions with year dummies. (2) The sample includes EU-27 countries for which the policy indicators are available for the period 2000–2011. (3) Robust standard errors in parentheses. Asterisks indicate estimated coefficients that are statistically significant at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level. (4) See Appendix B for the definition of the dependent variable. See Appendix C for the definition and the source of explanatory variables.