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Table 8 Uncompensated wage elasticity from Swedish research literature estimated using discrete structural labor supply models (percent)

From: Women’s and men’s responses to in-work benefits: the influence of children

Study by household type Wage elasticity Data (year) Selection
Married/cohabiting men    
 Flood et al. (2004) 0.05a HINK (1993, 1999)  
 Sacklén (2009) 0.06b HEK (2004)  
 Finansdepartementet (2010) 0.13c HEK (2007)  
Married/cohabiting women    
 Flood et al. (2004) 0.10a HINK (1993, 1999)  
 Sacklén (2009) 0.10b HEK (2004)  
 Finansdepartementet (2010) 0.18c HEK (2007)  
Single women    
 Andrén (2003) 0.77a HINK (1997, 1998) Single mothers
 Flood et al. (2007) 0.62a LINDA (1999) Single mothers
 Andersson & Hammarstedt (2008) 0.05a LINDA (2004) Foreign-born single women
 Finansdepartementet (2010) 0.21c HEK (2007)  
Single men    
 Finansdepartementet (2010) 0.09c HEK (2007)  
  1. Note: aPercentage change in the hours worked divided by the percentage change in gross earnings. bPercentage change in the hours worked divided by the percentage change in disposable income, referring to the overall effect of cohabitation and single habitation. cPercentage change in the hours worked divided by the percentage change in disposable income, calculated by increasing the municipal tax of 10 percent. These elasticities capture both the extensive and intensive margins