Women’s and men’s responses to in-work benefits: the influence of children

Table 8 Uncompensated wage elasticity from Swedish research literature estimated using discrete structural labor supply models (percent)

Study by household type	Wage elasticity	Data (year)	Selection
Married/cohabiting men
Flood et al. (2004)	0.05^a	HINK (1993, 1999)
Sacklén (2009)	0.06^b	HEK (2004)
Finansdepartementet (2010)	0.13^c	HEK (2007)
Married/cohabiting women
Flood et al. (2004)	0.10^a	HINK (1993, 1999)
Sacklén (2009)	0.10^b	HEK (2004)
Finansdepartementet (2010)	0.18^c	HEK (2007)
Single women
Andrén (2003)	0.77^a	HINK (1997, 1998)	Single mothers
Flood et al. (2007)	0.62^a	LINDA (1999)	Single mothers
Andersson & Hammarstedt (2008)	0.05^a	LINDA (2004)	Foreign-born single women
Finansdepartementet (2010)	0.21^c	HEK (2007)
Single men
Finansdepartementet (2010)	0.09^c	HEK (2007)

Note: ^aPercentage change in the hours worked divided by the percentage change in gross earnings. ^bPercentage change in the hours worked divided by the percentage change in disposable income, referring to the overall effect of cohabitation and single habitation. ^cPercentage change in the hours worked divided by the percentage change in disposable income, calculated by increasing the municipal tax of 10 percent. These elasticities capture both the extensive and intensive margins