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Table 1 Estimated effects of state hiring credits on employment growth, 2007-2011

From: Policy levers to increase jobs and increase income from work after the Great Recession

Credit variable(s) Contemp. +4 lags +8 lags +12 lags Credit variable(s) Contemp. +4 lags +8 lags +12 lags
A. ARRA variable Contemp. +6 lags +12 lags +24 lags      
 ARRA −0.0017 0.0002 −0.0001 0.0017      
  (0.0014) (0.0023) (0.0029) (0.0037)      
 Credit 0.0011 −0.0014 −0.0067 −0.0084 E. Wage requirement −0.0007 0.0023 0.0033 0.0026
  (0.0015) (0.0023) (0.0040) (0.0049)   (0.0010) (0.0021) (0.0039) (0.0040)
B. Jobs 0.0016 −0.0008 −0.0035 −0.0066  No wage requirement −0.0008 −0.0050 −0.0082 −0.0135
  (0.0014) (0.0025) (0.0046) (0.0045)   (0.0024) (0.0040) (0.0057) (0.0104)
 Payroll −0.0009 0.0005 0.0008 −0.0004 F. Recapture 0.0033 0.0057 0.0064 0.0082
  (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0030) (0.0024)   (0.0023) (0.0018) (0.0031) (0.0042)
 Investment 0.0091 0.0060 0.0053 0.0044  No recapture 0.0027 −0.0015 −0.0040 −0.0049
  (0.0012) (0.0024) (0.0058) (0.0043)   (0.0014) (0.0020) (0.0028) (0.0034)
 Others 0.0007 −0.0034 −0.0059 −0.0076 G. Industry 0.0001 −0.0042 −0.0068 −0.0094
  (0.0017) (0.0029) (0.0045) (0.0062)   (0.0012) (0.0020) (0.0029) (0.0036)
C. Full-time 0.0014 0.0004 −0.0019 −0.0018  Manufacturing −0.0011 −0.0090 −0.0091 −0.0132
  (0.0015) (0.0025) (0.0038) (0.0058)   (0.0012) (0.0028) (0.0040) (0.0049)
 Full-time equiv. −0.0050 −0.0076 −0.0091 −0.0177  No targeting 0.0019 0.0003 −0.0041 −0.0051
  (0.0015) (0.0028) (0.0054) (0.0070)   (0.0012) (0.0023) (0.0034) (0.0040)
 Part-time 0.0006 0.0092 H. Unemployed 0.0061 0.0084 0.0082 0.0116
    (0.0017) (0.0034)   (0.0014) (0.0021) (0.0033) (0.0045)
 Not specified 0.0009 −0.0027 −0.0049 −0.0055  Welfare recipient
  (0.0010) (0.0026) (0.0036) (0.0050)      
D. Equal to tax owed −0.0049 −0.0072 −0.0115 −0.0247  Disabled −0.0094 0.0015 0.0034 0.0036
  (0.0012) (0.0056) (0.0070) (0.0137)   (0.0019) (0.0033) (0.0024) (0.0074)
 Carry-forward 0.0012 −0.0009 −0.0049 −0.0051  No targeting 0.0012 −0.0014 −0.0069 −0.0084
  (0.0010) (0.0046) (0.0056) (0.0086)   (0.0016) (0.0023) (0.0041) (0.0051)
 Refundable 0.0012 0.0027 0.0055 0.0017 I. Temporary −0.0010 −0.0032 −0.0032 −0.0049
  (0.0030) (0.0037) (0.0042) (0.0061)   (0.0020) (0.0032) (0.0048) (0.0080)
 Not specified 0.0028 0.0003 −0.0014 −0.0018  Permanent 0.0009 −0.0030 −0.0064 −0.0081
  (0.0014) (0.0029) (0.0040) (0.0048)   (0.0009) (0.0019) (0.0026) (0.0035)
  1. Notes: The dependent variable is the first difference of the log of QCEW employment. The specification includes the first difference of the job credit dummy or dummies and 12 lags of this first difference. In addition to the contemporaneous effect, cumulative effects through 4, 8, and 12 lags are reported. Each panel reports a different specification. The first includes a single dummy variable for whether there is a credit, the second includes dummy variables for whether there is a credit with each of the four possible bases for benefits, etc. The specification also includes the following: the contemporaneous value and 12 lags of the first difference of the state-specific shock variable (in logs); interactions of the first difference of the shock variable interacted with state dummy variables; the contemporaneous value and 12 lags of the first difference of the log of the minimum wage prevailing in the state; the contemporaneous value and 12 lags of the first difference of the control for extended UI benefits; dummy variable for the political party of the governor (measured annually); dummy variables for each month in the sample; and interactions between calendar month dummy variables and state dummy variables. We add contemporaneous ARRA-obligated spending, and 24 lags, in logs; zeros are replaced with ones in levels before taking logs. (Cumulative effects through 6, 12, and 24 lags are reported.) We also add dummy variables for the quintiles of housing price appreciation for the 2000–2006 period interacted with calendar month dummy variables. We report estimates of the coefficients of ARRA spending only for the first specification; results were similar for the other models. The cyclical control is constructed using 2006 as the baseline year. The data are monthly. There are 2950 observations. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the state level
  2. Source: Neumark and Grijalva (2013), using QCEW data, database on state hiring credits, and other data sources