Enforcement of labor market regulations: heterogeneous compliance and adjustment across gender

Table 2 Arrival costs of labor inspectors and enforcement of labor regulations

Dependent variable	Log(enforcement measure)
	Men			Women
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Log(arrival cost)^*shr04	−0.856	−0.863	− 0.867	−0.661	− 0.671	−0.672
Log(arrival cost)^*shr04	[0.271]^***	[0.270]^***	[0.269]^***	[0.317]^**	[0.314]^**	[0.313]^**
Individual characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Political business cycle variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Quality of institutions variable	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Development level variables	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Demand shocks variables	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Province fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sector fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province-time trends	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
F statistic	9.95	10.22	10.40	8.72	9.12	9.22
p value of underid. test	0.0016	0.0014	0.0012	0.01815	0.0161	0.0157
Observations	148,166	148,166	148,166	83,906	83,906	83,906
R ²	0.686	0.688	0.697	0.715	0.721	0.732

Source: Own elaboration. Notes: OLS estimations. Standard errors clustered at the province-sector level in brackets. Individual characteristics include age and age squared, indicators for educational level, marital status and size of the firm, and number of children at home. Political business cycle variables include logarithm of social per capita expenditure and primary result as a percentage of total incomes. Quality of institutions includes logarithm of absenteeism rate in provincial elections. Development level variables include logarithm of the population, logarithm of the per capita household income, and unsatisfied basic needs poverty indicator. Demand shocks includes logarithm of building permits per capita
Significant at ***1%, **5%, and *10%